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1 Speak the truth; never forget; seek justice; and call on conscience.” Twenty years after
the June 4th Massacre, the Tiananmen Mother’s pledge has not penetrated the hearts
and  minds  of  the  Chinese  Communist  Party  leaders.  On  the  contrary,  almost
immediately after they launched the PLA tanks on the Beijing students and residents
who were asking for democracy and freedom, China’s leaders imposed a news blackout.
The history textbooks hardly mention the event,  and a search for the phrase “6.4”
(June 4th in Chinese) on Chinese Internet search engines calls up only blank pages.
When, at the beginning of this year, Zhang Shijun, a soldier who had taken part in the
repression, asked Hu Jintao to reverse the official verdict on the event, he was arrested.
2 FThe largest spontaneous social movement in the history of the PRC has been erased
from official  history.  However,  every  year  at  the  approach of  the  fateful  date,  the
authorities  become  nervous.  Anniversaries,  especially  those  of  events  that  do  not
appear on official calendars, are often opportunities for the “masses” to express their
discontent.  When  303  intellectuals  launched  “Charter  08”  in  December  2008,  the
leaders remembered the collective letters by Fang Lizhi, Bei Dao, and other scholars,
which in their requests for the release of Wei Jingsheng and a democratisation of the
regime  effectively  launched  the  protests  in  early  1989.  Determined  to  prevent  a
repetition of the events of 1989 at all costs, they decided to arrest Liu Xiaobo, one of the
drafters of the Charter, in an attempt to discourage people from signing the document.
It had the opposite effect, and to date more than 8,000 people have signed the Charter. 
3 Twenty  years  after  June  4th,  Liu  Xiaobo,  who  had  tried  to  negotiate  a  peaceful
evacuation of Tiananmen Square on the night of 3 June, is once again detained without
charge at an unknown location. Democracy activists are harassed by the police and
“asked” not to leave their homes on sensitive dates (such as 15 April, the anniversary of
Hu Yaobang’s death). And while the international media will devote large amounts of
space to the twentieth anniversary of the event on 4 June this year, China’s leaders will
do all in their power to make it go unnoticed. The only place in the territory of the
People’s Republic where it will be commemorated is the Special Administrative Region
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of Hong Kong, where its impact on political development has been considerable (see
Joseph Cheng’s article). 
4 Despite this attempt to erase public memory of the event, the June 4th Massacre had a
huge impact  on the  evolution of  the  PRC.  First,  the  pro-democracy movement  was
obliged to  devise  a  complete  change in  strategy after  the massacre.  The intra-elite
strategy, which had been successful in the 1980s, became impractical with the purging
of reformists who had allowed pro-democracy forces to grow. Mass demonstrations
were even more unthinkable once the Party leadership had shown it was prepared to
impose the harshest repression to prevent any threat to its rule. It took many years to
devise  a  new strategy,  and to  this day the movement remains  quite  weak (see  the
article by Béja and Goldman). Intellectuals, who had played an important role in the
emergence  of  a  semi-autonomous  public  sphere,  have  also  been  affected  by  the
repression of the pro-democracy movement. Feng Chongyi shows that one consequence
has been the development of liberalism and of the conviction that constitutionalism
represents  the solution to  China’s  political  problems among part  of  those who had
taken part in the movement. 
5 Since  the  events,  Party  leaders  have  been  obsessed  by  the  need  to  prevent  the
repetition  of  large-scale  pro-democracy  demonstrations.  To  achieve  this  goal,  they
have decided to combat liberalisation, which they believe can only lead to the collapse
of  Party  rule.  They  have  taken  all  possible  steps  to  prevent  the  emergence  of
alternative political  lines,  whether inside or outside the Party (see Michel  Bonnin’s
article).  In  particular,  they  have  reinforced  Party  control  over  judicial  organs  to
prevent victims of abuse from using the courts to vent their anger (see the article by
Willy  Lam).  But  of  course,  Party  leaders  understand that  the  massacre  provoked a
profound crisis of legitimacy, and they have had to find a new source of legitimacy to
stay in power. Deng Xiaoping, drawing lessons from the collapse of the Soviet Union
and aware that socialism was discredited, turned to the economy. In order to gain the
support of citizens who had been shocked by his decision to crush the peaceful protest
movement, Deng launched an authoritarian modernisation movement that aimed to
improve the living standards of certain segments of the population, and achieve the old
dream of  Chinese  elites  since  the  Opium War:  to  make  China  a  rich  and  powerful
country. Barry Naughton shows that the June 4th Massacre was instrumental in the
adoption of the strategy of economic development after 1992. This new strategy has
been successful. The growth rates of the Chinese economy have been so impressive that
the developed world has abandoned its post-June 4th condemnation of the regime to
accommodate China’s rise. In his article, Wu Guoguang shows that far from pushing
towards democratisation, as common wisdom has it, the growth of China’s economy
has actually allowed the Communist Party to impose its values on the international
community instead. 
6 Twenty years after the 56 days that shook the world, the CCP is still in command of the
country, the democracy movement is isolated from society, and China has become a
great power respected by most Western countries. However, despite what appears to be
an impressive success, the leadership remains nervous every year at the approach of
sensitive anniversaries, and even more so this year. Whatever happens, as Perry Link
emphasises, the memory of June 4th remains a ghost that haunts the leaders as well as
the citizens of the People’s Republic. China can’t become a modern power until it has
the courage to confront the reality of its recent past.   
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